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Laura Symczyk sought relief under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b), on 
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. The District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed 
Symczyk‟s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
after defendants Genesis HealthCare Corporation and 
ElderCare Resources Corporation extended an offer of 
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 in full satisfaction of her 
alleged damages, fees, and costs. At issue in this case is 
whether a collective action brought under § 216(b) of the 
FLSA becomes moot when, prior to moving for “conditional 
certification” and prior to any other plaintiff opting in to the 
suit, the putative representative receives a Rule 68 offer. We 
will reverse and remand. 
I. 
 From April 2007 through December 2007, Symczyk 
was employed by defendants as a Registered Nurse at 
Pennypack Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On 
December 4, 2009, Symczyk initiated a collective action 
under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of herself and all 
similarly situated individuals, alleging defendants violated the 
FLSA when they implemented a policy subjecting the pay of 
certain employees to an automatic meal break deduction 
whether or not they performed compensable work during 
their breaks.
1
 On February 18, 2010, defendants filed an 
                                              
1
 Symczyk‟s amended complaint identified those “similarly 
situated” as 
All persons employed within the three years 
preceding the filing of this action by Defendants 
. . . , whose pay was subject to an automatic 30 
minute meal period deduction even when they 
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answer to Symczyk‟s complaint and served her with an offer 
of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 in the amount of 
“$7,500.00 in alleged unpaid wages, plus attorneys‟ fees, 
costs and expenses as determined by the Court.”2 Symczyk 
                                                                                                     
performed compensable work during the unpaid 
“meal break” . . . . 
These persons include, but are not limited to, 
secretaries, housekeepers, custodians, clerks, 
porters, registered nurses, licensed practical 
nurses, nurses‟ aides, administrative assistants, 
anesthetists, clinicians, medical coders, medical 
underwriters, nurse case managers, nurse 
interns, nurse practitioners, practice supervisors, 
professional staff nurses, quality coordinators, 
resource pool nurses, respiratory therapists, 
senior research associates, operating room 
coordinators, surgical specialists, admissions 
officers, student nurse technicians, trainers, and 
transcriptionists employed at any of 
Defendants‟ facilities during the three years 
preceding the filing of this action. 
2
 In part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 provides:  
(a) At least 14 days before the date set for trial, 
a party defending against a claim may serve on 
an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on 
specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, 
within 14 days after being served, the opposing 
party serves written notice accepting the offer, 
either party may then file the offer and notice of 
acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk 
must then enter judgment. 
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did not dispute the adequacy of defendants‟ offer but 
nevertheless declined to respond. 
 
 The District Court—unaware of the offer of 
judgment—held a Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 scheduling conference 
on March 8, 2010. Two days later, the court entered a 
scheduling order providing for “an initial ninety (90) day 
discovery period, at the close of which [Symczyk] will move 
for conditional certification under § 216(b) of the FLSA.” 
Following the court‟s ruling on certification, the parties were 
to have “an additional six (6) month discovery period, to 
commence at the close of any Court-ordered opt-in window.” 
On March 23, 2010, defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(1), contending that, because Symczyk had 
effectively rejected their Rule 68 offer of judgment, see Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 68(a) (providing a plaintiff with 14 days to accept 
an offer), she “no longer ha[d] a personal stake or legally 
cognizable interest in the outcome of this action, a 
prerequisite to this Court‟s subject matter jurisdiction under 
Article III of the United States Constitution.” Symczyk 
objected, citing defendants‟ strategic attempt to “pick off” the 
named plaintiff before the court could consider her 
“certification” motion.3  
                                                                                                     
(b) An unaccepted offer is considered 
withdrawn, but it does not preclude a later offer. 
Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not 
admissible except in a proceeding to determine 
costs. 
3
 On March 29, 2010, defendants removed Symczyk‟s related 
state-court action to the United States District Court for the 
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On May 19, 2010, the District Court “tentatively 
concluded” that defendants‟ Rule 68 offer mooted the 
collective action and that the action should be dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Symczyk v. Genesis 
HealthCare Corp., Civ. No. 09-5782, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
49599, at *17 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2010). In its memorandum, 
the court explained:  
Symczyk does not contend that other 
individuals have joined her collective action. 
Thus, this case, like each of the district court 
cases cited by Defendants, which concluded 
that a Rule 68 offer of judgment mooted the 
underlying FLSA collective action, involves a 
single named plaintiff. In addition, Symczyk 
does not contest Defendants‟ assertion that the 
Rule 68 offer of judgment fully satisfied her 
claims. . . .  
Id. at *16-17. The court instructed Symczyk to file a brief in 
support of continued federal jurisdiction on her state-law 
claims and her motion for class certification under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23 by June 10, 2010. Id. at *17. Symczyk did so but 
conceded she did not believe the court possessed an 
                                                                                                     
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Thereafter, on April 13, 
2010, the parties jointly filed a proposed stipulated order 
providing Symczyk would voluntarily dismiss her related 
state-law action and amend her complaint in this action to 
include those state-law claims asserted in the related action. 
The District Court entered the parties‟ stipulated order on 
April 15, 2010, and Symczyk filed an amended 
class/collective action complaint on April 23, 2010.  
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independent basis for jurisdiction over her state-law claims in 
the event her FLSA claim was dismissed. The District Court 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Symczyk‟s state-law claims in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c) and dismissed those claims without prejudice. The 
court also dismissed Symczyk‟s FLSA claim with prejudice 
in accordance with its earlier memorandum. Symczyk timely 
appealed.
4
 
II. 
A. 
 Enacted in 1938, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., 
was designed “to aid the unprotected, unorganized and lowest 
                                              
4
 Prior to dismissing the action, the District Court had subject 
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b). We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the court‟s order granting 
defendants‟ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is plenary. Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 
220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). Because defendants‟ 
motion to dismiss was based on facts outside the pleadings 
(i.e., their Rule 68 offer of judgment), the trial court was 
entitled to weigh and evaluate the evidence bearing on the 
jurisdictional dispute. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). This factual 
evaluation “may occur at any stage of the proceedings.” Id. 
“When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 
12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion.” 
Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
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paid of the nation‟s working population; that is, those 
employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure 
for themselves a minimum subsistence wage.” Brooklyn Sav. 
Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945). Under the 
“collective action” mechanism set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b), an employee alleging an FLSA violation may bring 
an action on “behalf of himself . . . and other employees 
similarly situated,” subject to the requirement that “[n]o 
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless 
he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and 
such consent is filed in the court in which such action is 
brought.”  
Prior to 1947, the FLSA permitted an aggrieved 
employee to “designate an agent or representative to maintain 
such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly 
situated.” Martino v. Mich. Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 
173, 175 n.1 (1946) (quoting Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 
(1938)). But in response to “excessive litigation spawned by 
plaintiffs lacking a personal interest in the outcome,” 
Congress amended the Act to eliminate “representative action 
by plaintiffs not themselves possessing claims.” Hoffmann-La 
Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989); see also 
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 
Stat. 84, 87 (1947). Further altering the collective action 
procedure in § 216(b), Congress inserted a requirement that 
similarly situated employees must affirmatively “opt in” to an 
ongoing FLSA suit by filing express, written consents in 
order to become party plaintiffs. See id. 
In deciding whether a suit brought under § 216(b) may 
move forward as a collective action, courts typically employ a 
two-tiered analysis. During the initial phase, the court makes 
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a preliminary determination whether the employees 
enumerated in the complaint can be provisionally categorized 
as similarly situated to the named plaintiff. If the plaintiff 
carries her burden at this threshold stage, the court will 
“conditionally certify” the collective action for the purposes 
of notice and pretrial discovery. In the absence of statutory 
guidance or appellate precedent on the proper definition of 
“similarly situated,” a divergence of authority has emerged on 
the level of proof required at this stage. Some trial courts 
within our circuit have allowed a plaintiff to satisfy her 
burden simply by making a “substantial allegation” in her 
pleadings that she and the prospective party plaintiffs suffered 
from a single decision, plan or policy, but the majority of our 
circuit‟s trial courts have required the plaintiff to make a 
“modest factual showing” that the proposed recipients of opt-
in notices are similarly situated. See Wright v. Lehigh Valley 
Hosp., Civ. No. 10-431, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 86915, at *7-
10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2010) (canvassing cases).  
Under the “modest factual showing” standard, a 
plaintiff must produce some evidence, “beyond pure 
speculation,” of a factual nexus between the manner in which 
the employer‟s alleged policy affected her and the manner in 
which it affected other employees. See Smith v. Sovereign 
Bancorp, Inc., No. 03-2420, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 21010, at 
*10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2003). We believe the “modest factual 
showing” standard—which works in harmony with the opt-in 
requirement to cabin the potentially massive size of collective 
actions—best comports with congressional intent and with the 
Supreme Court‟s directive that a court “ascertain[ ] the 
contours of [a collective] action at the outset.” See Hoffman-
10 
 
La Roche, 493 U.S. at 172.
5
   
                                              
5
 Although this two-step approach is nowhere mandated, it 
appears to have garnered wide acceptance. And, while courts 
retain broad discretion in determining whether to 
“conditionally certify” a collective action, it is useful to 
prescribe a uniform evidentiary standard. Cf. In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316-20 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(outlining the guiding principles for a district court‟s 
discretionary evaluation of a class certification motion in the 
Rule 23 context). 
 This case illustrates how an uncertain standard may 
work to the detriment of § 216(b) plaintiffs. Here, the court—
unaware of defendants‟ Rule 68 offer—issued a case 
management order allotting Symczyk “an initial ninety (90) 
day discovery period” to compile evidence before she would 
be expected to move for “conditional certification.” Symczyk 
represents she considered the standard for “conditional 
certification” a “moving target in our circuit” and requested 
discovery in order to buttress the allegations in her pleadings 
with sufficient evidence to make a “meaningful motion” at 
this initial stage. Because defendants‟ Rule 68 offer preceded 
the commencement of this preliminary discovery period, 
however, Symczyk had no opportunity to gather such 
evidence before the court granted defendants‟ motion to 
dismiss. Had Symczyk been operating under the assumption 
that the court would employ the “substantial allegation” 
standard, she may have been prepared to move for 
“conditional certification” without conducting minimal 
discovery. And, had the court in fact facilitated notice to 
potential opt-ins based solely on the allegations in Symczyk‟s 
complaint, defendants‟ Rule 68 offer may not have antedated 
11 
 
After discovery, and with the benefit of “a much 
thicker record than it had at the notice stage,” a court 
following this approach then makes a conclusive 
determination as to whether each plaintiff who has opted in to 
the collective action is in fact similarly situated to the named 
plaintiff. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 
1233, 1261 (11th Cir. 2008). “This second stage is less 
lenient, and the plaintiff bears a heavier burden.” Id. Should 
the plaintiff satisfy her burden at this stage, the case may 
proceed to trial as a collective action.
6
  
                                                                                                     
the arrival of a consent form from a party plaintiff, an 
occurrence that would have fundamentally transformed the 
court‟s mootness analysis.  
6
 Because only the notice stage is implicated in this appeal, 
we need not directly address the level of proof required to 
satisfy the similarly situated requirement at the post-discovery 
stage. Although this standard must necessarily be more 
rigorous than the standard applicable at the notice stage, the 
fact-specific, flexible nature of this approach affords district 
judges latitude in exercising their discretion. See 45C Am. 
Jur. 2d Job Discrimination § 2184 (2011) (listing fourteen 
factors courts may consider at the post-discovery stage). As 
we have explained: 
A representative (but not exhaustive or 
mandatory) list of relevant factors [at this stage] 
includes whether the plaintiffs are employed in 
the same corporate department, division and 
location; advanced similar claims of . . . 
discrimination; sought substantially the same 
form of relief; and had similar salaries and 
circumstances of employment. Plaintiffs may 
12 
 
Absent from the text of the FLSA is the concept of 
“class certification.” As the Eighth Circuit has noted, 
however, “[m]any courts and commentators . . . have used the 
vernacular of the Rule 23 class action for simplification and 
ease of understanding when discussing representative cases 
brought pursuant to § 16(b) of the FLSA.” Kelley v. Alamo, 
964 F.2d 747, 748 n.1 (8th Cir. 1992). As a result, courts 
commonly refer to a plaintiff‟s satisfaction of her burden at 
the notice stage as resulting in “conditional certification,” see, 
e.g., Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 389 n.17 (3d Cir. 
2007), or “provisional certification,” see, e.g., Nash v. CVS 
Caremark Corp., 683 F. Supp. 2d 195, 199 (D.R.I. 2010). 
Similarly, the court‟s second-step analysis is traditionally 
triggered by a defendant‟s motion to “decertify the class” on 
the ground that its proposed members are not similarly 
situated. See, e.g., Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 967 
(3d Cir. 1992). And, in the same fashion, a named plaintiff 
becomes a “class representative,” see, e.g., id. at 966, his 
attorney becomes “class counsel,” see, e.g., Harkins v. 
Riverboat Servs., Inc., 385 F.3d 1099, 1101 (7th Cir. 2004), 
and similarly situated employees become “potential class 
members,” see, e.g., In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 
F.3d 508, 518 (4th Cir. 2011). 
Despite this judicial gloss on § 216(b), “the 
„certification‟ we refer to here is only the district court‟s 
exercise of [its] discretionary power, upheld in Hoffmann-La 
                                                                                                     
also be found dissimilar on the basis of case 
management issues, including individualized 
defenses. 
Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 389 n.17 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citations omitted). 
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Roche, to facilitate the sending of notice to potential class 
members,” and “is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
existence of a representative action under FLSA.” Myers v. 
Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 
Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261 n.40 (“District courts following the 
two-step . . . approach should treat the initial decision to 
certify and the decision to notify potential collective action 
members as synonymous.”).7 Defendants here rely heavily on 
the superficiality of the similarities between the 
“certification” processes inherent in Rule 23 class actions and 
§ 216(b) collective actions in arguing Symczyk could not 
purport to “represent” the interests of similarly situated 
employees before anyone had opted in to the action. And, as 
noted, expedient adoption of Rule 23 terminology with no 
mooring in the statutory text of § 216(b) may have injected a 
measure of confusion into the wider body of FLSA 
jurisprudence. Although “conditional certification” may not 
vest a § 216(b) “class” with the independent legal status that 
certification provides a Rule 23 class, see Trotter v. Klincar, 
748 F.2d 1177, 1183 (7th Cir. 1984), this realization does not 
                                              
7
 In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Supreme Court recognized the 
efficacy of § 216(b) hinges on “employees receiving accurate 
and timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective 
action, so that they can make informed decisions about 
whether to participate.” 493 U.S. at 170. To ensure this task 
“is accomplished in an efficient and proper way,” the Court 
interpreted § 216(b) as endowing district courts with “the 
requisite procedural authority to manage the process of 
joining multiple parties in a manner that is orderly, sensible, 
and not otherwise contrary to statutory commands or the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 170-71. 
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control our mootness analysis in the manner suggested by 
defendants. Provision of notice does not transform an FLSA 
suit into a “representative action,” but, as we will explain, its 
central place within the litigation scheme approved of by the 
Supreme Court in Hoffmann-La Roche necessarily shapes our 
approach to squaring Rule 68 and § 216(b). 
B. 
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts to “actual „Cases‟ and 
„Controversies.‟” Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 
554 U.S. 269, 298 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). “When 
the issues presented in a case are no longer „live‟ or the 
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, the 
case becomes moot and the court no longer has subject matter 
jurisdiction.” Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 340 
(3d Cir. 2004). “An offer of complete relief will generally 
moot the plaintiff‟s claim, as at that point the plaintiff retains 
no personal interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Id. 
Thus, whether or not the plaintiff accepts the offer, no 
justiciable controversy remains when a defendant tenders an 
offer of judgment under Rule 68 encompassing all the relief a 
plaintiff could potentially recover at trial. See Rand v. 
Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1991). We have 
recognized, however, that conventional mootness principles 
do not fit neatly within the representative action paradigm. Cf. 
Lusardi, 975 F.2d at 974 (“[S]pecial mootness rules apply in 
the class action context, where the named plaintiff purports to 
represent an interest that extends beyond his own.”).  
 Rule 68 was designed “to encourage settlement and 
avoid litigation.” Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985). In 
the representative action arena, however, Rule 68 can be 
15 
 
manipulated to frustrate rather than to serve these salutary 
ends. Exploring this deviation from Rule 68‟s purposes, the 
Supreme Court has noted: 
Requiring multiple plaintiffs to bring separate 
actions, which effectively could be „picked off‟ 
by a defendant‟s tender of judgment before an 
affirmative ruling on class certification could be 
obtained, obviously would frustrate the 
objectives of class actions; moreover it would 
invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating 
successive suits brought by others claiming 
aggrievement.  
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 
(1980); see also Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 
F.2d 1030, 1050 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (“By tendering 
to the named plaintiffs the full amount of their personal 
claims each time suit is brought as a class action, the 
defendants can in each successive case moot the named 
plaintiffs‟ claims before a decision on certification is 
reached.”).  
We addressed the tension between Rules 23 and 68 in 
Weiss. There, the named plaintiff filed a federal class action 
complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and, prior to moving for 
class certification, received a Rule 68 offer of judgment in 
full satisfaction of the individual relief sought. The plaintiff 
rejected the offer, and the court granted the defendants‟ 
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the complaint on mootness 
grounds. On appeal, we explored the applicability of the 
“relation back” doctrine to a scenario in which the 
defendants‟ “tactic of „picking off‟ lead plaintiffs with a Rule 
16 
 
68 offer . . . may deprive a representative plaintiff the 
opportunity to timely bring a class certification motion, and 
also may deny the court a reasonable opportunity to rule on 
the motion.” 385 F.3d at 347. Finding application of the 
doctrine necessary to vindicate the policy aims inherent in 
Rule 23, we held that, “[a]bsent undue delay in filing a 
motion for class certification . . . where a defendant makes a 
Rule 68 offer to an individual claim that has the effect of 
mooting possible class relief asserted in the complaint, the 
appropriate course is to relate the certification motion back to 
the filing of the class complaint.” Id. at 348. As there had 
been no undue delay, we reversed and directed the district 
court to allow the plaintiff to file a class certification motion 
that would “relate back” to the filing of the complaint. Id.8 
                                              
8
 In Weiss, we noted that our opinion might be viewed as 
creating tension with Lusardi, which involved alleged 
violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. Section 7(b) of the ADEA 
incorporates § 216(b) by reference. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). 
However, in distinguishing Lusardi, we did not rely on the 
differences between the procedures applicable to Rule 23 and 
§ 216(b) actions. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348-49. Instead, we 
explained that Lusardi, unlike Weiss, involved a voluntary 
settlement entered into by the named plaintiffs rather than “an 
offer of judgment made in response to the filing of a 
complaint.” Id. at 349. We wrote:  
In this appeal, the „picking off‟ scenarios 
described by the Supreme Court in Roper are 
directly implicated. In Lusardi they were not. . . 
. In Lusardi, no unilateral action by the 
Defendant rendered the plaintiffs‟ claims 
17 
 
In essence, the relation back doctrine allows a district 
court to retain jurisdiction over a matter that would appear 
susceptible to dismissal on mootness grounds by virtue of the 
expiration of a named plaintiff‟s individual claims. In Sosna 
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401 (1975), the Supreme Court found 
federal court jurisdiction to adjudicate a live controversy 
between members of a certified Rule 23 class and a named 
defendant was not extinguished by the named plaintiff‟s 
claim becoming moot before the district court reached the 
merits of the case. Addressing the possibility that resolution 
of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs may occur 
“before the district court can reasonably be expected to rule 
on a certification motion,” the Court explained such 
certification “can be said to „relate back‟ to the filing of the 
complaint” when the issue might otherwise evade review. Id. 
at 402 n.11; see also U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 
U.S. 388, 399 (1980) (preserving an Article III court‟s 
authority to review class certification issues when a named 
plaintiff‟s claims are “so inherently transitory that the trial 
court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for 
class certification before the proposed representative‟s 
individual interest expires”).  
This equitable principle has evolved to account for 
calculated attempts by some defendants to short-circuit the 
                                                                                                     
„inherently transitory.‟ Defendants here used the 
Rule 68 offer to thwart the putative class action 
before the certification question could be 
decided.  
Id. These considerations are not unique to the Rule 23 
context, and Weiss did not turn on the disparity between opt-
in and opt-out actions. 
18 
 
class action process and to prevent a putative representative 
from reaching the certification stage. Certification vests a 
named plaintiff with a procedural right to act on behalf of the 
collective interests of the class that exists independent of his 
substantive claims. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399 (explaining 
that, once a class has been certified, the mooting of a class 
representative‟s individual claims does not invariably result in 
the mooting of the entire action because “the class of 
unnamed persons described in the certification acquire[s] a 
legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named 
plaintiff]”). Although traditional mootness rules would 
ordinarily apply absent an affirmative ruling on class 
certification, “in certain circumstances, to give effect to the 
purposes of Rule 23, it is necessary to conceive of the named 
plaintiff as a part of an indivisible class and not merely a 
single adverse party even before the class certification 
question has been decided.” Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347. The 
rationale underpinning the relation back doctrine serves to 
shield from dismissal on mootness grounds those claims 
vulnerable to being “picked off” by defendants attempting to 
forestall class formation. As the Seventh Circuit has 
explained: 
Normally, . . . a class action must be certified as 
such in order for it to escape dismissal once the 
claims of the named plaintiff become moot. But 
the courts have recognized that an absolute 
requirement would prevent some otherwise 
justiciable claims from ever being subject to 
judicial review. . . . [J]ust as necessity required 
the development of the relation back doctrine in 
cases where the underlying factual situation 
naturally changes so rapidly that the courts 
19 
 
cannot keep up, so necessity compels a similar 
result here. If the class action device is to work, 
the courts must have a reasonable opportunity 
to consider and decide a motion for 
certification. If a tender made to the individual 
plaintiff while the motion for certification is 
pending could prevent the courts from ever 
reaching the class action issues, that opportunity 
is at the mercy of a defendant, even in cases 
where a class action would be most clearly 
appropriate. 
Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 
1978) (citations omitted).  
When a defendant‟s Rule 68 offer threatens to preempt 
the certification process, reconciling the conflicting 
imperatives of Rules 23 and 68 requires allocating sufficient 
time for the process to “play out.” Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348. By 
invoking the relation back doctrine, a court preserves its 
authority to rule on a named plaintiff‟s attempt to represent a 
class by treating a Rule 23 motion as though it had been filed 
contemporaneously with the filing of the class complaint. 
Consequently, “the „relation back‟ principle ensures that 
plaintiffs can reach the certification stage.” Sandoz v. 
Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 919 (5th Cir. 2008). 
III. 
A. 
The issue we must resolve on this appeal, then, is 
whether an FLSA collective action becomes moot when (1) 
the putative representative receives a Rule 68 offer in full 
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satisfaction of her individual claim prior to moving for 
“conditional certification,” and (2) no other potential plaintiff 
has opted in to the suit.
9
 Animating our decision in Weiss was 
the ability of defendants to use Rule 68 “to thwart the putative 
class action before the certification question could be 
decided.” 385 F.3d at 349. Symczyk cites similar arguments 
in the § 216(b) context and discerns no material distinction 
between the two procedures insofar as this consideration is 
concerned. By contrast, defendants contend Weiss does not 
apply in the FLSA context because a putative § 216(b) named 
plaintiff allegedly lacks the “representative” status that 
accords a Rule 23 named plaintiff a personal stake in the 
matter sufficient to confer continued Article III jurisdiction 
once his individual claim has been mooted. We believe the 
                                              
9
 Relying on a careful analysis of various district court efforts 
to grapple with the interplay of Rule 68 and § 216(b) 
provided in Briggs v. Arthur T. Mott Real Estate LLC, No. 
06-0468, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 82891 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 
2006), the District Court concluded Symczyk‟s case was 
distinguishable from those in which courts declined to 
dismiss complaints following Rule 68 offers because, in 
those, “other individuals had already opted in to join the 
collective action, it was unclear whether the Rule 68 offer 
fully satisfied the plaintiff's claims, or the plaintiff had 
already filed a motion for conditional certification under § 
216(b).” Symczyk, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 49599, at *13 
(footnotes omitted). Here, Symczyk did not dispute the 
adequacy of the offer as it pertained to the value of her 
individual claim. However, as we will explain, we believe 
treating the other two conditions as dispositive would be 
imprudent. 
21 
 
considerations warranting application of the relation back 
doctrine to Rule 23 class actions also apply to § 216(b) 
collective actions. 
In support of their effort to confine Weiss to the class 
action setting, defendants rely principally on the dissimilar 
roles played by Rule 23 and § 216(b) named plaintiffs. As 
noted, the statutory form of aggregation provided for in the 
FLSA requires each party plaintiff affirmatively to opt in to a 
collective action by filing a consent form “in the court in 
which such action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Whereas a 
member of a certified class in a Rule 23(b)(3) proceeding will 
be bound by judgment unless he has intentionally opted out of 
the suit, resolution of a § 216(b) collective action will not 
bind any similarly situated employee absent his express, 
written consent. See id.; LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 
513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975).
10
 Defendants argue a § 
216(b) named plaintiff whose individual claim has been 
mooted by a Rule 68 offer before anyone has opted in to the 
action cannot purport to possess a personal stake in 
representing the interests of others.
11
  
                                              
10
 Of course, class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or 
(b)(2) are “mandatory” class actions in that class members are 
not permitted to opt out. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v. Dukes, --- 
U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011). 
11
 As noted, the Portal-to-Portal Act notionally abolished 
“representative actions.” See Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 
Stat. 84, 87 (1947). This amendment, however, did not strip 
an employee—such as Symczyk—of her right to act on behalf 
of similarly situated co-workers. Rather, the 1947 amendment 
eliminated the so-called “agency suit,” divesting nonparty 
representatives of standing to initiate actions under § 216(b). 
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Although defendants‟ logic has some surface appeal, 
reliance on the watershed event of an opt-in to trigger 
application of the special mootness rules that prevail in the 
representative action context incentivizes the undesirable 
strategic use of Rule 68 that prompted our holding in Weiss.
12
 
                                                                                                     
See id. “By identifying „employees‟ as the only proper parties 
in a § 216(b) action, the Portal to Portal Act aimed to ban 
representative actions that previously had been brought by 
unions on behalf of employees.” Cameron-Grant v. Maxim 
Healthcare Servs., 347 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003); see 
also Arrington v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 531 F. Supp. 498, 502 
(D.D.C. 1982) (explaining Congress amended the FLSA “to 
eradicate the problem of totally uninvolved employees 
gaining recovery as a result of some third party‟s action in 
filing suit”). The FLSA does not prevent an employee, 
serving as lead plaintiff, from fulfilling a representative role. 
When defendants made their Rule 68 offer of judgment, 
Symczyk represented only her own interests, and defendants‟ 
potential liability consisted entirely of the individual damages 
sought by Symczyk as named plaintiff. That Symczyk had yet 
to assume a representative role vis-à-vis the allegedly 
similarly situated employees listed in her complaint stemmed 
not from some purported statutory prohibition but instead 
from defendants‟ successful attempt to pick her off before the 
court had occasion to consider the suitability of allowing the 
claims to be litigated collectively with Symczyk as lead 
plaintiff. 
12
 In both Susman and Zeidman, the relation back rationale 
was deployed to salvage a court‟s jurisdiction over class 
complaints when the named plaintiffs‟ claims had ostensibly 
been mooted while their motions for class certification were 
pending. However, because “the federal rules do not require 
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As the Supreme Court explained in Hoffmann-La Roche, 
actualization of § 216(b)‟s purposes often necessitates a 
district court‟s engagement at the notice phase of the 
proceeding. 493 U.S. at 170-71; see also Morgan, 551 F.3d at 
1259 (“[T]he importance of certification, at the initial stage, is 
that it authorizes either the parties, or the court itself, to 
facilitate notice of the action to similarly situated 
employees.”). When a defendant‟s Rule 68 offer arrives 
before the court has had an opportunity to determine whether 
a named plaintiff has satisfied his burden at this threshold 
stage, and the court has therefore refrained from overseeing 
the provision of notice to potential party plaintiffs, it is not 
surprising to find the offer has also preceded the arrival of 
any consent forms from prospective opt-ins. If our mootness 
inquiry in the § 216(b) context were predicated inflexibly on 
whether any employee has opted in to an action at the 
moment a named plaintiff receives a Rule 68 offer, employers 
would have little difficulty preventing FLSA plaintiffs from 
attaining the “representative” status necessary to render an 
action justiciable notwithstanding the mooting of their 
individual claims. 
In Sandoz, the only court of appeals‟ decision to 
                                                                                                     
certification motions to be filed with the class complaint, nor 
do they require or encourage premature certification 
determinations,” we explained in Weiss that “reference to the 
bright line event of the filing of the class certification motion 
may not always be well-founded.” 385 F.3d at 347. 
Consequently, we extended the doctrine to instances in which 
the plaintiff moved for class certification subsequent to 
receipt of a Rule 68 offer so long as he did so without “undue 
delay.” Id. at 348. 
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address the applicability of the relation back doctrine in the 
FLSA context, the Fifth Circuit concluded Congress did not 
intend, through the enactment of § 216(b), to create an 
“anomaly” by allowing employers “to use Rule 68 as a sword, 
„picking off‟ representative plaintiffs and avoiding ever 
having to face a collective action.” 553 F.3d at 919. The court 
elaborated: 
[T]he differences between class actions and 
FLSA § 216(b) collective actions do not compel 
a different result regarding whether a 
certification motion can “relate back” to the 
filing of the complaint. The status of a case as 
being an “opt in” or “opt out” class action has 
no bearing on whether a defendant can 
unilaterally moot a plaintiff‟s case through a 
Rule 68 offer of judgment. Although the 
differences between Rule 23 class actions and 
FLSA § 216(b) collective actions alter the 
conceptual mootness inquiry, each type of 
action would be rendered a nullity if defendants 
could simply moot the claims as soon as the 
representative plaintiff files suit. Thus, the 
policies behind applying the “relation back” 
principle for Rule 23 class actions apply with 
equal force to FLSA § 216(b) collective actions.   
Id. at 920 (citations omitted). There, the defendant tendered 
its offer of judgment approximately one month after Sandoz 
had commenced her FLSA action, and Sandoz waited thirteen 
months after filing her complaint to move for “conditional 
certification.” Id. at 921. Borrowing language from Weiss and 
holding that “relation back is warranted only when the 
plaintiff files for certification „without undue delay,‟” id. 
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(quoting Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348), the Fifth Circuit remanded 
for the district court to consider whether Sandoz had “timely 
sought certification of her collective action,” id. 
B. 
 Although the opt-in mechanism transforms the manner 
in which a named plaintiff acquires a personal stake in 
representing the interests of others, it does not present a 
compelling justification for limiting the relation back doctrine 
to the Rule 23 setting. The considerations that caution against 
allowing a defendant‟s use of Rule 68 to impede the 
advancement of a representative action are equally weighty in 
either context. Rule 23 permits plaintiffs “to pool claims 
which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.” 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985). 
Similarly, § 216(b) affords plaintiffs “the advantage of lower 
individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of 
resources.” Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170. Rule 23 
promotes “efficiency and economy of litigation.” Crown, 
Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349 (1983). 
Similarly, “Congress‟ purpose in authorizing § 216(b) class 
actions was to avoid multiple lawsuits where numerous 
employees have allegedly been harmed by a claimed violation 
or violations of the FLSA by a particular employer.” Prickett 
v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003).  
When Rule 68 morphs into a tool for the strategic 
curtailment of representative actions, it facilitates an outcome 
antithetical to the purposes behind § 216(b). Symczyk‟s 
claim—like that of the plaintiff in Weiss—was “acutely 
susceptible to mootness” while the action was in its early 
stages and the court had yet to determine whether to facilitate 
notice to prospective plaintiffs. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347 
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(internal quotation marks omitted). When the certification 
process has yet to unfold, application of the relation back 
doctrine prevents defendants from using Rule 68 to “undercut 
the viability” of either type of representative action. See id. at 
344. 
C. 
 Additionally, the relation back doctrine helps 
safeguard against the erosion of FLSA claims by operation of 
the Act‟s statute of limitations. To qualify for relief under the 
FLSA, a party plaintiff must “commence” his cause of action 
before the statute of limitations applying to his individual 
claim has lapsed. Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 24 
F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1994).
13
 For a named plaintiff, the 
action commences on the date the complaint is filed. 29 
U.S.C. § 256(a). For an opt-in plaintiff, however, the action 
commences only upon filing of a written consent. Id. § 
256(b). This represents a departure from Rule 23, in which 
the filing of a complaint tolls the statute of limitations “as to 
all asserted members of the class” even if the putative class 
member is not cognizant of the suit‟s existence. See Crown, 
Cork & Seal Co. 462 U.S. at 350 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Protracted disputes over the propriety of dismissal 
in light of Rule 68 offers may deprive potential opt-ins whose 
claims are in jeopardy of expiring of the opportunity to toll 
the limitations period—and preserve their entitlements to 
                                              
13
 Plaintiffs seeking recovery under the FLSA must 
commence an action within two years of the alleged violation 
(or within three years if the violation is “willful”). 29 U.S.C. 
§ 255(a). 
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recovery—by filing consents within the prescribed window.14  
D. 
 In sum, we believe the relation back doctrine helps 
ensure the use of Rule 68 does not prevent a collective action 
from playing out according to the directives of § 216(b) and 
the procedures authorized by the Supreme Court in 
Hoffmann-La Roche and further refined by courts applying 
this statute. Depriving the parties and the court of a 
reasonable opportunity to deliberate on the merits of 
collective action “conditional certification” frustrates the 
objectives served by § 216(b). Cf. Sandoz, 553 F.3d at 921 
(explaining “there must be some time for a[n FLSA] plaintiff 
                                              
14
 Defendants contend a party plaintiff‟s cause of action vests 
at the moment he files his consent form and that no 
conception of the relation back doctrine would permit this 
statutorily mandated act of opting in to relate back to the 
filing of the collective action complaint. While perhaps true, 
this assertion is beside the point. For the sake of argument, 
consider a hypothetical co-worker of Symczyk‟s who was 
subjected to a willful FLSA violation and whose tenure with 
the company also ended in December 2007. Because 
Symczyk‟s complaint was dismissed before this (or any) 
employee had opted in to the action, this potential plaintiff 
forfeited any claim to relief in December 2010. The relation 
back doctrine cannot, at this juncture, redeem this would-be 
plaintiff‟s cause of action. However, had Symczyk been 
permitted to move—in timely fashion—for “conditional 
certification” in light of defendants‟ March 2010 motion to 
dismiss, this plaintiff may have received notice of the 
ongoing collective action prior to her claim growing stale. 
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to move to certify a collective action before a defendant can 
moot the claim through an offer of judgment”). Absent undue 
delay, when an FLSA plaintiff moves for “certification” of a 
collective action, the appropriate course—particularly when a 
defendant makes a Rule 68 offer to the plaintiff that would 
have the possible effect of mooting the claim for collective 
relief asserted under § 216(b)—is for the district court to 
relate the motion back to the filing of the initial complaint. 
 Upon remand, should Symczyk move for “conditional 
certification,” the court shall consider whether such motion 
was made without undue delay, and, if it so finds, shall relate 
the motion back to December 4, 2009—the date on which 
Symczyk filed her initial complaint. If (1) Symczyk may yet 
timely seek “conditional certification” of her collective 
action, (2) the court permits the case to move forward as a 
collective action (by virtue of Symczyk‟s satisfaction of the 
“modest factual showing” standard), and (3) at least one other 
similarly situated employee opts in, then defendants‟ Rule 68 
offer of judgment would no longer fully satisfy the claims of 
everyone in the collective action, and the proffered rationale 
behind dismissing the complaint on jurisdictional grounds 
would no longer be applicable. If, however, the court finds 
Symczyk‟s motion to certify would be untimely, or otherwise 
denies the motion on its merits, then defendants‟ Rule 68 
offer to Symczyk—in full satisfaction of her individual 
claim—would moot the action. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
